Cannae Read online

  A Roman legionary stood with his left foot forward and slightly crouched in the normal fighting position. From the front he was protected by his long, plywood shield which covered his body, left arm and upper legs. Additional protection for his torso came from a mail cuirass or metallic pectoral. His head was the most vital area not covered by the shield and this was why the helmet was the next most important piece of defensive equipment after the shield. The various patterns of bronze helmet in use by the Romans and their allies at this time offered good protection from a blow on the top of the head and, if provided with cheek pieces, a limited degree of coverage for the face. His left leg, the one nearest the enemy and as a result vulnerable, was often fitted with a metal greave. As far as we can tell most of the Spanish and Gallic warriors at Cannae lacked both helmets and body armour. In tribal warfare such expensive equipment tended to be the preserve of chieftains and the wealthy who were always a small minority, although it should be remembered that these well-equipped men would tend to take their place in the front rank of a formation. We do not know whether many of these men wore captured Roman armour or whether Hannibal had reserved this exclusively for his Libyans. Most warriors relied exclusively on their long, flat shields for protection, making it all the more devastating a loss if a shield had been lost to a Roman pilum.

  It was very difficult to disable an opponent with a single blow; either a heavy strike to the head, a massive thrust past shield and through any armour to the body, or a hit on the leg breaking the bone and causing the victim to fall. Attempting to deliver such a strong cut or thrust exposed the attacker to greater risk of wounding, especially as his right arm, and perhaps part of his right side, lost the protection of his shield. It was less risky to deliver weaker attacks to the unprotected extremities of an opponent, even though this was unlikely to kill him quickly. There is some skeletal evidence from battlefield graves in the ancient period, and rather more from the middle age. The pattern and type of wounds is remarkably consistent and suggests how hand-to-hand combats were fought. (However, it is important to remember that only wounds which involved damage to bone are preserved in this record. Injuries to fleshy parts of the body or the stomach would not leave any trace. Bearing in mind that our information is derived from battlefield grave finds, we have no record of the men who suffered wounds but survived the battle.) The sheer physical force of some blows surprised many specialists, but such single, almost certainly fatal, injuries were rare. Usually the dead suffered a number of lesser wounds, none of which were incapacitating, before being finished off by a heavier blow to the head. The most common were hits to the lower legs, especially the left leg nearest the enemy, the right arm, undefended by a shield, and the left side of the head. Even a number of such light wounds did not seriously impair the man’s ability to continue fighting.

  We should imagine the two front ranks separated by a metre or so, prodding and cutting at each other in a constant clatter of blade against shield, helmet and sometimes flesh. Once again individuals hoped that their appearance–physical size, expression, plumes, shiny armour, impressive hair or beard–and the noise they made would intimidate their opponents and aid their victory. Cato the Elder, who served during the Second Punic War as a cavalryman and junior officer, although he probably was not at Cannae, always maintained that a soldier’s bearing, confidence and the ferociousness of his war cry were more important that his actual skill with a blade. The majority of men took care to shelter as much as possible behind their shields, warding off blows and occasionally delivering a careful attack themselves. Such men inflicted only minor wounds, weakening an opponent but not putting him out of the fight.

  A minority of soldiers fought with far more aggression, aiming savage cuts or thrusts at the enemy, and it was these who inflicted nearly all of the serious injuries, although they in turn suffered a higher proportion of casualties. Some men, especially amongst the Romans, may have used their heavy shields to buffet and unbalance the enemy, punching with their whole weight behind the boss. Ideally, when a man in the opposing front rank was killed or knocked to the ground, the victor stepped into his place. This was highly dangerous for he risked attack from the men to the front and sides in the second rank of the enemy formation, but it was also the best way to begin the enemy’s rout. As soldiers began to feel that they were no longer protected on their flanks by their comrades and that enemies were amongst them, their nervousness could quickly turn to panic. It was at this stage in the fighting, when a unit turned and fled, that most casualties occurred, and this was the single most important factor in explaining the far higher casualties always suffered by the losing side in an ancient battle. Men in flight lost the vital protection of their shields and the victors were able to strike freely at their backs. The sight of enemies, who until recently had posed a direct threat to them, turning their backs seems to have encouraged the majority of soldiers, the ones who fought with the intention of staying alive, to act aggressively and expunge their fears in a one-sided massacre of all they could catch. Minor wounds, most of all wounds to the legs, suffered during the fighting could now prove fatal, for the weakened men were often slower to run and more likely to be caught and finished off by the vengeful pursuers. Blows delivered when the victim was helpless were stronger and more closely spaced. It appears that it was not uncommon for the attackers to strike repeatedly at the fallen enemy, so that as many as seven or eight massive cuts were delivered to the skull, any one of which would probably have proved fatal. The savagery of such attacks on already defeated enemies is a powerful reminder that battles, especially hand-to-hand battles, are not fought by calm soldiers fighting coldly, carefully and logically, but by frightened, vulnerable and emotional human beings.38

  This was the most dramatic end to a hand-to-hand encounter, when men from one unit cut their way into the enemy ranks, created a panic and inflicted a brief massacre as the defeated group turned to flee, but it was not the most common outcome of a fight. More often in the initial clash neither side was able to gain such a decisive advantage and if any men tried to break the enemy ranks they were swiftly killed themselves. The very fact that both sides had sufficient confidence to meet in hand-to-hand fighting in the first place, rather than being persuaded to retire or flee by the enemy’s intimidating advance and the volleys of missiles, which they had hurled, made it unlikely that either would swiftly give way. Hand-to-hand fighting was physically strenuous and emotionally draining. If one side did not quickly collapse then the actual combat could not continue for more than a few minutes. Instead the two sides seem to have drawn apart, perhaps little more than a few metres, for even at such a short distance they were out of the reach of the enemy’s hand-held weapons. There they drew breath, shouted at the enemy and, perhaps, threw any remaining missiles at them.

  After each such lull, one side or the other would surge forward into contact again and another brief flurry of actual hand-to-hand fighting occur. If no outside force intervened, then victory would eventually go to the side which endured the stress of staying so close to the enemy for the longest and was still able to urge enough of its men forward to renew the fighting. The pauses in the fighting most probably grew longer and longer as it became more difficult to persuade the weary soldiers to advance and fight another time and another. The great emphasis the Romans placed on encouraging and rewarding individual boldness in their soldiers acknowledged the very real need for aggressive soldiers who would lead a fresh charge forward and try to fight their way into the enemy’s formation. These situations also made great demands on an army’s officers to lead the way, even though this might mean that they suffered casualties at a disproportionately high rate. The Romans had an optio behind each century to hold the men in place and a centurion in the front rank to urge them onwards. Centurions were supposed to be selected for their determination and skill as leaders rather than individual prowess in fighting, and as infantry combats drew on this sort of stubbornness, it was especially important. There wer
e six tribunes per legion and the majority of these appear to have fought with the heavy infantry in battle. They were not tied to any one position, but moved around the battle line, encouraging the men and committing reserves as necessary. In addition to these men there were senior officers. Servilius Geminus began the battle with the infantry and he was subsequently joined there by Paullus, who is described as moving to crisis points in the line, leading local charges and fighting hand to hand, and always urging on his soldiers to greater effort. The Roman army at Cannae had an especially large number of senior officers concentrated on a limited frontage to inspire the men and control the battle. Hannibal’s decision to advance the middle of his line and provoke a battle first in the very centre acted to reduce even more the width of the initial contact and so concentrate the attentions of so many officers in this limited area. On the Carthaginian side, both Hannibal himself and his brother Mago acted in a similar fashion to the Roman officers, keeping close to the fighting to inspire and direct their men, and there were presumably many junior officers and tribal chieftains performing the same task.39

  Early in the fighting it might have been possible to persuade the entire line to advance together, but this sort of order was swiftly lost in the chaos of noise, dust and confusion. As the struggle went on it is likely that it was hard to persuade more than an individual maniple or company to surge forward and renew the fight at the same time, and eventually things may have degenerated further so that only small groups managed to act together. Close contact with the enemy caused unit formations to degenerate into loose masses, and we should never imagine combats as fought by neat blocks of men, the soldiers in perfect rank and file. Under the pressure of combat the less enthusiastic soldiers tried to escape, edging to the rear, whilst the boldest pressed forward. The majority massed in the middle, ready to follow the bold few if their attack proved successful or the more nervous if these started to flee. The fighting line was not a solid wall of men, but a row of increasingly rough groups clustered together, each man’s position a reflection of his keenness. Its openness allowed officers to move around with some freedom, only occasionally actually fighting hand-to-hand themselves, although they were always at risk of being hit by missiles or singled out by a lone attacker. Facing this was another similar line formed by the enemy, the two usually separated by a short distance, save where a unit or group had managed to build up sufficient aggression to charge into contact. It was difficult for most soldiers to know how well even their own unit’s fight was going unless they were in the front rank, and only if they could make sense of the overwhelming noise could they possibly gauge the progress of the fight elsewhere in the line. This created a permanent state of nervousness, since men knew that, if a serious breakthrough occurred in their line and it collapsed into flight, then the men most likely to be killed by the pursuing enemy were the ones who hesitated before they ran.

  Once again, our sources are vague as to how long the fighting continued after the Romans had reached the advanced centre of the Punic line, but both Polybius and Livy testified to the stiff resistance put up by the Gallic and Spanish infantry to the Roman juggernaut. Here, as at Telamon and some other battles, the tribal warriors belied the literary stereotype of the wild barbarian whose initial ferocity rapidly declined as he grew weary. In numbers the Punic centre was roughly equal to the Roman hastati and, since they occupied a similar frontage, was presumably deployed in much the same depth. Depth gave a formation great resilience in combat and this, along with the presence of so many senior officers, encouraging the men and sharing with them the risks of combat, prolonged the fight. Livy tells us that, ‘… at first equally matched in strength and confidence, the Gauls and Spaniards stood firm for as long as their formation held. At length the Romans, surging forward again and again on an even front and in dense array drove back the advanced wedge [curved line] formed by the enemy which was too thin and weak to hold.’40

  The Gauls and Spaniards had no immediate supports, whilst the hastati were just the first of the three Roman lines. The manipular system was intended to allow the reinforcement of the fighting line with fresh troops, with the intention that their enthusiasm would persuade the whole line to surge forward into contact against the weary enemy. The reserve lines could reinforce the fighting line if it was coming under pressure, or advance to exploit any successes and breakthroughs it managed to achieve. The many senior officers, tribunes, prefects and above, who had pressed forward to oversee the fighting in the centre of the line were there not just to inspire the men and witness their behaviour, but also to control the commitment of the second and third lines. However well the Punic infantry fought, in the end, the Romans’ weight of numbers would come to bear as more and more maniples were fed into the combat. Eventually the pressure grew too great and the Celts and Spaniards began to give way. They did so slowly at first, perhaps moving back after each flurry of fighting, but still facing the enemy. We read in accounts of other battles of the ancient world of lines which were forced back several hundred metres or even more than a kilometre, but still maintained a front and did not dissolve into rout. At Cannae the Punic centre at first gave way gradually in this fashion, but, as the Romans poured more and more men into the main line to exploit this success, the line broke and ran. As usual, the Carthaginian foot seem to have suffered very heavy casualties as they fled from a vengeful enemy.41

  Encirclement

  As Hannibal’s centre collapsed and the legionaries chased sword in hand after the fleeing warriors, the Roman plan appeared to be working. Varro was still on the left flank, his allied horsemen engaged in sporadic and indecisive skirmishing with the elusive Numidian cavalry. The lack of movement on this wing was entirely satisfactory from the consul’s point of view, for his task was simply to protect the flanks of the heavy infantry and allow them to win the great victory. It is questionable to what extent Varro could have observed the progress of the fighting in the centre for the dust would only have added to the confusion, and most unlikely that he knew of the flight of the Roman cavalry on the right, but he may well have been able to see that the Roman foot were steadily pressing forward. Paullus, Servilius and the other officers with the infantry knew that the plan was working and redoubled their efforts to pour more of their reserves into the gap, giving the enemy no opportunity to rally. In the centre of the battlefield a great mass of Roman infantrymen some tens of thousands strong pressed forward to complete the rout of the enemy foot.

  The Roman legion was supposed to operate with wide gaps between its maniples and significant intervals between each of the three lines. The openness of its formation allowed the legion to advance without falling into disorder even over comparatively rough terrain. It is impossible, even for well-drilled troops, to march in a perfectly straight line, and the more uneven the terrain, the more probable that a unit will veer to one side or the other. The wide intervals between the maniples of the legion allowed them to cope with such deviation without units colliding and merging together and ceasing to be independent tactical entities. The unusual formation adopted by the Roman infantry at Cannae sacrificed this openness and with it most of the flexibility of the manipular system. Varro deployed the maniples on a very narrow frontage but in great depth and reduced the width of the gaps between each unit. As soon as the Roman line began to move forward, these intervals would have tended to disappear, the maniples merging together so that instead of many semi-independent tactical units there was simply one mass. The greater depth of each maniple may have reduced the space normally maintained between each of the three lines, but, even if it had not, the confined nature of the plain between the Aufidius and the hills around Cannae probably had the same result. There may well have been some blurring between the lines as well as amongst the individual maniples as the Roman centre lumbered forward.

  The Roman plan relied entirely upon their numerically superior infantry to win the day. The cavalry were there primarily to hold off Hannibal’s better quality and more
numerous horsemen for long enough to allow the Roman foot to break the Punic line. It was therefore important for the legions to win as quickly as possible. The Roman officers who clustered just behind the fighting line knew this and were all the more willing to feed men from the reserve lines into the combat. Hannibal had deliberately placed his centre much closer to the enemy than his flanks and, as he hoped, it was there that the infantry fighting first developed. As the Romans began to make headway against this advanced position, more and more men from the reserve lines were sent to reinforce their fighting line. It was not just the maniples directly behind the engaged units which were drawn into the struggle, for Polybius tells us that large numbers of men on either side were sucked into the combat. The distinction between separate maniples had already started to dissolve as the army advanced, and especially amongst the units who then came into contact with the enemy, but rapidly vanished altogether as more and more men were packed into the combat being fought on a very small front. The Romans’ breakthrough was achieved at the price of their good order and their infantry were now more like a crowd than an organized body divided into distinct subunits closely controlled by their officers.42