Cannae Page 12

  Yet victory must have seemed close as the Roman mass punched straight through the very centre of Hannibal’s line. The Celts and Spaniards on either side of the gaping hole in their line seem not to have broken, but retreated in better order. The concentration of the overwhelming weight of the Roman attack on the centre and the use of most reserves there probably meant that they were under far less pressure. The Romans surged forward until they were level with the starting position of the flanks of Hannibal’s main line and kept going, for there was nothing to oppose them. The attack still had considerable momentum, but very little order, and was no longer under anyone’s control. In such a mass an officer of any rank could only influence the men immediately around him.

  As the Roman mass streamed forward, they found themselves with Hannibal’s Libyan infantry arrayed in columns on either side of them. The Libyans had as yet played no part in the fighting and were fresh and in good order. There were probably no more than 8,000–10,000 of them, divided into two forces each roughly the size of a Roman legion. The similarity went further, since they were now dressed and armed with Roman equipment stripped from the dead of Trebia and Trasimene, although it is unlikely that they had adopted manipular organization and tactics and probable that they still fought as a phalanx. We do not know who gave the orders–perhaps Hannibal had ridden from his routed centre and gone in person to one of the Libyan columns, sent a messenger or simply explained in detail to the Libyans’ commanders before the battle what was required of them–but the column on the left turned to form a line facing to the right and those on the right turned to face left. Then the two phalanxes marched forward and attacked into the flanks of the crowded mass of pursuing Roman soldiers.43

  The Romans were in no position to form fighting lines to face either of the new threats. The maniples were hopelessly intermingled and beyond the control of their leaders. The already confused situation was probably exacerbated by the Roman-like appearance of the bodies of infantry moving towards them and it may have taken some time to realize that these were hostile. The loss of a clear sense of direction seems to be common under the stress of combat and few men may have realized that there should not be any friendly troops approaching from that direction. Small groups of soldiers may have turned to form rough lines facing the enemy, but they lacked missile weapons, were fatigued through combat and never formed a coherent line. The Libyans’ charge stopped the Roman advance dead, robbing it of all momentum. There were now no organized reserves in the Roman army to feed into the combat and renew the surge forward. Officers improvised as best they could, but movement in the packed ranks was probably difficult and became even harder as it contracted under the pressure of the twin enemy attacks. The two phalanxes of Libyans gripped the Romans like a vice, and around them the surviving Celtic and Spanish troops, joined perhaps after a while by some of the routers, pressed round to add to the fighting line. The Romans were now fighting on three sides, but unable to support the combat in any direction properly.

  In the meantime events had occurred elsewhere on the battlefield which would seal the fate of the Roman centre. Hasdrubal had led his close order cavalry in a devastatingly brutal charge against the Roman right wing, shattering and virtually destroying it in a brief pursuit. The Carthaginian had kept his men under tight control and, when they had rested and reformed, he led them behind the Roman main line, moving against Varro on the left, and ignoring the massed infantry in the enemy centre. Varro’s allied horsemen were still engaged in their stand-off with the Numidians, but the sight of the lines of Hasdrubal’s Gauls and Spaniards approaching from the rear utterly shattered their spirit. Without waiting for the Carthaginians to charge home, the Roman left wing dissolved into a panicked flight in which the consul joined. Their position was untenable, and, if they had in fact formed with their flank on the hills around Cannae, any delay in flight might have resulted in their being trapped. They could not have won any combat with a more numerous enemy attacking from two sides, but their flight sealed the fate of the Roman army. Hasdrubal had once again kept his men closely in hand, helped perhaps by the enemy’s swift flight, which meant that the Punic horse did not have to go through with their charge and fight a mêlée. He gave orders for the Numidians to pursue the fleeing enemy horsemen–a task to which they were ideally suited–and led his own command against the rear of the Roman foot. The confused mass of 50,000 or so Roman and allied heavy infantryman and maybe as many as 20,000 velites was now surrounded.44

  Annihilation

  There is a tendency for descriptions of the battle to stop at this point, when Hannibal’s tactical genius had allowed his army to surround the more numerous Romans by using the weight of the enemy’s attack against them. Viewed at the grand tactical level, all the significant moves in the battle had already occurred and the utter defeat of the Roman army was now inevitable. There was to be little tactical sophistication in the final phase of the battle, but fighting would continue for much of the rest of the day as the Carthaginians attacked from all sides and systematically slaughtered the greater part of the Roman infantry mass.45

  The reduction in size of the gaps normally maintained between the maniples and lines in a Roman army caused units to merge together into one crowd as the army had advanced, especially when more and more troops were drawn into the very centre of the line. Probably the narrowness of the plain between Cannae and the River Aufidius, originally attractive to Varro because it offered protection for his flanks, speeded the disintegration of the Romans’ order. By the time that the breakthrough in the centre had been stopped in its tracks by the Libyans’ counter-attack and Hasdrubal’s cavalry swept down against the Roman rear, there were no longer ordered maniples and lines of Roman and allied infantry, but a disorganized mass. There was, for instance, no question of a reserve line of triarii simply turning round, kneeling behind their shields and presenting an impenetrable line of spear points at the attacking cavalry. This has sometimes mistakenly been taken to suggest that the entire triarii were absent, probably guarding the larger camp, otherwise Hasdrubal’s men could not have acted so effectively against the Roman rear. However, this fails to appreciate the confusion amongst the legionaries and allies by this stage of the battle. In places some groups, perhaps occasionally even whole maniples, of these veteran spearmen may have been able to form a dense knot with weapons towards the enemy, but there was no question of an entire third line facing to the rear. Most of the army’s officers had been drawn forward to assist in and direct the fighting in the centre, and there was certainly no one left in charge of the entire third line, which anyway is unlikely still to have existed as a clearly distinct entity. Hasdrubal’s cavalrymen could not have charged home against any group of infantry which remained in close formation facing towards them. Instead, such knots of men were bombarded with missiles and the cavalry swept on to charge wherever the Roman foot were scattered and unprepared.46

  The Roman foot were hemmed in on all sides and nowhere able to form a coherent and properly supported fighting line. Time after time the Libyans, and however many of the Gauls and Spaniards had rallied, renewed their attack, surging forward into actual contact to fight a brief mêlée. They fought till they were weary and the edges of their swords and spear points blunted through killing. As the fight drew on, the lulls between each bout of actual combat can only have grown longer and longer as it became harder for their officers to urge the exhausted men forward once again. Hannibal, Mago, Hasdrubal and other officers continued to stay close to the fighting, inspiring their men, trying to organize the fight as far as this was possible and occasionally leading them personally in a charge. In the same way Paullus, Servilius, and the military tribunes still moved around amongst the Roman mass, trying to bring aid and encouragement to some of the many crisis points.

  The Romans’ position was hopeless. They were even more tired than the enemy, especially the Libyans who had remained in reserve in the early phases of the battle, and the disintegration of their
formation and unit structure hindered their efforts to fight. Hand-to-hand fighting with edged weapons required massive physical effort. Hannibal’s professional soldiers were probably fitter and better trained to cope with this. Although the bulk of the Roman army came from peasant stock, accustomed to prolonged physical labour, if not to the noise and confusion of battle, the massive expansion of the army before Cannae may have swept into its ranks many younger, older or less fit soldiers. Even so many seem to have put up a very determined resistance and Hannibal’s victory was only to be bought at a high price. The Romans admired stubbornness and expected it of their ordinary soldiers. Many of the men can have known little of what was going on in the rest of the battlefield and perhaps did not realize that the entire army faced disaster. Some fought on, as the legionaries had in the equally hopeless situation at Trasimene.47

  As the day drew on, the hot wind blowing clouds of dust across the dry plain, Hannibal’s infantry closed again and again to fight hand to hand with the Romans. Wearily they cut and jabbed at the legionaries sheltering behind their shields, trying to break into their ranks. Sometimes they failed to make any impression and the two sides drew apart after a brief time of actual combat. Very occasionally, the Romans forced them back locally, killing any men who tried to hack their way into the Roman ranks. Most often it was the Roman line which went back slowly, facing the enemy, or dissolved into rout. Then the Carthaginians pursued them, striking at unprotected backs, killing especially the men wounded in the earlier fighting who were now too weak or slow to escape. Knocked to the ground, they were dispatched with frenzied blows, usually to the head. Sometimes the press in the Roman ranks was so great that they could not retreat even when things went badly for them in the combat. Unable to escape because of the mass of men behind them, legionaries were cut down offering little resistance. Some, inside the formation and unable to see what was going on, may have had little opportunity to realize their peril until the men in front were cut down and enemies suddenly appeared to strike at them. Still the Carthaginians continued to press on, their shields and the breasts of their horses stained with blood.48

  In the end widespread Roman resistance collapsed as the army broke and fled. Most men were cut down as they ran, but significant numbers seem to have escaped to the temporary safety of the two Roman camps or the surrounding villages. Although the Carthaginians were attacking from all sides, they do not appear to have formed a complete ring. This was probably especially true of the cavalry, who had to remain mobile if they were to be most effective. Nor do we know how many of Hannibal’s other foot were rallied or had remained in reasonable shape to support the Libyans, and it is more than possible that, until the very end, the Punic army remained significantly outnumbered. Polybius tells us only that Paullus eventually succumbed to his many wounds received whilst fighting heroically and leading the stiffest Roman resistance. Livy’s version is much more detailed and rich in pathos. He claimed that a military tribune, one Cnaeus Lentulus, discovered the badly wounded Paullus propped up against a rock. Lentulus offered him his horse, but Paullus nobly refused and then the two were swept apart by a group of fleeing Romans, closely pursued by the enemy. Lentulus was saved by the speed of his horse, whilst the consul died under a hail of enemy missiles, the Carthaginians passing him without realizing whom they had just killed. The scene allowed Livy, and those other later authors who followed the same tradition, to give Paullus another speech making it clear that he was not responsible for the disaster and still adhered to Fabius’ cautious strategy. It is interesting that this account implies a fluid, mass flight of the Roman army rather than a fight to the death. Most probably the story is yet another invention intended to salvage Paullus’ reputation and lay the blame for the disaster on his colleague. There was in fact no obligation for a Roman commander to die when his army suffered defeat, and the suicide of defeated leaders only ever became common during Rome’s later civil wars. However, the scandals of Paullus’ first consulship may well have made him far more concerned about his reputation and unwilling to endure more controversy.49

  Livy says that 7,000 fugitives made it to the smaller Roman camp and 10,000 to the larger camp on the far bank of the river, although these may well be the troops left behind as garrison there by Paullus. The greater part of the Roman army now lay dead or dying on the plain beside the Aufidius, but, as is so often the case, there is disagreement in our sources about their numbers. Polybius says that around 70,000 Romans fell in the battle, a further 10,000 were captured soon afterwards in the larger camp, and only around 3,000 foot and 370 cavalry managed to escape. There is clearly a problem with these figures, for they amount to a total of 89,000, which is larger than the figure he gives for the entire Roman strength before the battle. Livy’s figures are 45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry killed and 3,000 and 1,500, respectively, captured immediately; these seem more plausible and conform roughly with the rounded up figure of 50,000 repeated on several occasions both in his account and those of other authors. More than half of the Roman army had fallen, but the cost of achieving this slaughter was dear for Hannibal’s army. Polybius states that the Punic losses amounted to 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spaniards and Libyans, and 200 cavalry, a total of 5,700. Livy provides the higher estimate of about 8,000 men. In either case this was an appallingly high figure for a victorious army, representing a casualty rate of 11.5 per cent or 16 per cent respectively. This was more than two to three times the average loss suffered by winning armies in the battles of the ancient world and testifies to the harshness of the fighting even after the Romans were surrounded. It is even possible that these figures included only the dead or mortally wounded, so that perhaps they should be at the very least doubled to include wounded. If so, then Hannibal’s losses were staggering.50

  Varro had escaped to the town of Venusia, but his colleague was dead and so were the proconsul Servilius Geminus, and Marcus Minucius Rufus, Fabius’ Magister Equitum, by that time probably serving as a tribune. Both of the quaestors, Lucius Atilius and Lucius Furius Bibaculus, elected as financial officials and deputies for the consuls, had also fallen. Of the forty-eight military tribunes commanding the army’s eight legions more than half, twenty-nine, were killed. In addition to these were eighty men either already members of the Senate or whose achievements justified their enrolment during the next census. Somewhere between a quarter and a third of Roman senators were killed or went into captivity at Cannae, and many more members had lost sons or other relations. The equestrians who provided the cavalry also suffered great losses, as did the yeoman farmers who provided the bulk of the legions’ heavy infantry. Never had any defeat struck so hard at the very heart of Roman society. As night fell on 2 August 216 BC, Rome’s very future seemed in doubt.

  FIVE

  The Aftermath

  MOPPING UP

  The plain beside the River Aufidius must have been a truly ghastly sight after the battle. Over 50,000 men lay dead or dying in an area of little more than a few square kilometres, many of the bodies horribly disfigured from blows with edged weapons. Many wounded survived to the next day, as the stench of blood and corruption grew worse in the sun’s warmth. Whilst the Romans and Italians were dispatched by Punic soldiers, the Carthaginians received whatever medical care was offered by their comrades. Many of the Gallic warriors in the army were accompanied by their wives and families and we must imagine these women searching for their husbands amongst the heaps of bodies that night and the next morning. Other figures moved amongst the dead and dying to plunder anything of value. There is a nightmarish quality about many of the descriptions of the aftermath of Cannae, Livy saying that the carnage was ‘shocking even to enemies’. He describes the masses of bodies, infantry and cavalry intermingled, the wounded begging for death as an end to their suffering, and other men who had scraped holes in the ground and buried their heads to smother themselves. The Carthaginians are supposed to have found a live Numidian, ‘his nose and ears ripped’ where the Roman who had lain on to
p of him had bitten at his enemy with his dying breath. Later sources would invent further horrors, claiming that Hannibal bridged the River Aufidius with Roman corpses. The reality of Cannae was probably even more appalling than such horrific inventions, for it remains one of the bloodiest single day’s fighting in history, rivalling the massed slaughter of the British Army on the first day of the Somme offensive in 1916.1

  Cannae was a stunning blow to the Romans. The greatest army ever fielded by the Republic, which had marched so confidently into battle, had been almost annihilated. The survivors, clustered in the dubious sanctuary offered by the ramparts of the Roman camps, were mostly in shock, and only a few were capable of any effort to escape. The men in the larger camp had played little part in the battle, apart from an abortive attack on Hannibal’s camp, and were presumably still in organized units and led by their officers. They are supposed to have sent a message to the other camp, instructing the men there to cross the river and join forces, so that both groups could then move to Canusium in the west. The nervous survivors in the smaller camp expressed little enthusiasm for this plan, but Livy tells us that one tribune, Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, managed to persuade 600 men to break out and cross the ford, brushing aside the few parties of Numidians–probably more interested in looting than fighting–who got in their way. According to another source, a mere sixty-two men followed Tuditanus and another tribune, Cnaeus Octavius. Joined by a part, but not all of the garrison of the larger camp, this force then escaped to Canusium, having to pass Hannibal’s camp en route. From a later passage it appears that these numbered around 4,000 infantry and 200 cavalry.2