The Fall of Carthage Read online

  The Romans did nothing to aid the Saguntines once the siege had begun. Livy claims that they sent another embassy to Hannibal, but his chronology at this point is hopelessly confused and, since Polybius does not mention such a move, it is probably best to reject this. Saguntum fell at the end of 219 or in the first weeks of 218, and news of this may have arrived in Rome within a month. An embassy was sent to Carthage in the latter part of the winter, including both of the outgoing consuls of 219, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Marcus Livius Salinator. Livy tells us that it was headed by Quintus Fabius Maximus, thus completing the trio of men who would play prominent roles in the approaching war, but it seems more likely that the leader was the experienced former censor, Marcus Fabius Buteo, who had fought in Sicily as consul in 245. The embassy protested Hannibal's actions and demanded to know whether he had been acting with the approval of the Carthaginian Senate. The Carthaginians were faced with the choice of condemning Hannibal and handing him and his senior officers over to the Romans for punishment, or going to war with Rome. The style of diplomacy practised by Roman embassies seems seldom to have been very subtle, but in this case they were clearly obliged to seek revenge for an attack on an ally. In one tradition which depicted a strong party opposed to the Barcids, a certain Hanno is supposed to have condemned Hannibal's actions, but on the whole the Carthaginians responded angrily to the brusque Roman demands. They refused to recognize the Ebro treaty, saying that they had never ratified it and citing Catulus' referral of the peace terms in 241 to Rome, and disputed their need to recognize any relationship between Rome and Saguntum. Fabius is supposed to have stood in the middle of the chamber and announced that he carried in the folds of his toga both peace and war, and could let fall from it whichever the Carthaginians chose. Tempers ran high amongst the assembled Punic senators and the presiding suffete shouted out for him to choose. When Fabius responded by declaring that he let fall war, a great shout of 'We accept it!' filled the hall. In this way war was declared, although it may have become inevitable earlier than this. Hannibal certainly began preparations for his invasion of Italy once he returned to winter quarters after the fall of Saguntum. It is also quite possible that the Comitia Centuriata had already voted for war if the ambassadors failed to gain a satisfactory response at Carthage.5

  Polybius discussed the underlying causes of the renewal of hostilities in some detail and concluded that there were three main factors. The first was the bitterness or anger of Hamilcar Barca at the end of the First War when he was forced to surrender despite remaining undefeated in Sicily. The second, and most important, factor was the unprincipled Roman seizure of Sardinia in 238, whilst Carthage was still reeling from the turmoil of the

  Mercenary Rebellion. Not only did this humiliation increase Hamilcar's resentment, but it spread a similar hatred of Rome throughout the Punic population. It was with the aim of building up a power base to use against Rome that Hamilcar went to Spain, throwing himself wholeheartedly into a programme of expansion. The successes of his family in the Spanish Peninsula formed the third cause, since the growth in Carthaginian power encouraged them to believe that they were now strong enough to defeat their old rival.6

  Polybius supported his view of Hamilcar's motivation by recounting an anecdote which Hannibal had told whilst he was at the court of the Seleucid King Antiochus III in the 190s. Just before leaving to take up his new command in Spain Hamilcar Barca had sacrificed at the altar of a deity, who is called Zeus by Polybius and Jupiter by Livy, but was probably Ba'al Shamin. Receiving favourable omens, he called his 9-year-old son Hannibal to his side and asked the boy whether he would like to accompany him on the expedition. The lad, who had probably seen little of his father during his early life, responded enthusiastically, begging permission to go. Hamilcar placed the boy's hand on the sacrificial victim and made him swear a solemn oath 'never to be a friend to the Romans'.7 Hannibal told this story to convince Antiochus that he was not consorting with the king's Roman enemies, and as Polybius received it at best third-hand, its accuracy is now impossible to assess. In the later Roman tradition the oath's wording becomes stronger, the child swearing to be always an enemy of Rome.8

  In Polybius' version of events Hannibal inherited the war with Rome from his father, in much the same way that Alexander the Great would actually undertake the Persian expedition planned by his father Philip II. For a long time many modern historians accepted this interpretation, and a few went further, claiming that the plan to invade Italy across the Alps and even Hannibal's battle tactics may have been first devised by his father. More recently the idea that the war was the premeditated project of the Barcid family has fallen from favour, in part because historians are generally reluctant to attribute important events to the moods and actions of individual leaders, preferring to seek explanation in more general trends. Most often the argument has revolved around the precise details and chronology of the events leading up to the war, since Polybius is vague about much of this, whilst our other sources are of questionable reliability.9

  Of fundamental importance is the question of what the Carthaginians led by the Barcid family were hoping to achieve in Spain, and once again we must lament the absence of sources from the Punic perspective. It has often been assumed that the loss of profitable territories in Sicily and Sardinia forced Carthage to seek revenue from elsewhere, and frequently the Spanish silver mines are cited in this context. Certainly, Hamilcar did bring many of these directly under Punic rule, and although it took several years to begin their effective exploitation, this did allow his family to mint several series of coins with an especially high silver content. In other respects it is difficult to see that expansion in Spain allowed any more profitable exploitation of its resources than had been possible through the Punic communities already there. In the short term there was certainly considerable income from the booty of successful campaigns, at least some of which may have come into State hands. Thus Hamilcar's reply to the Roman embassy's demand to know why he was fighting so many wars of conquest was that he needed to annex land to make a profit and so be able to pay off the Punic war debt to Rome. Much of the profit from successful campaigns went to pay for and expand the army in Spain. Punic recruiting officers had long been hiring Spanish soldiers, but the Barcid province brought a large part of this massive pool of military manpower directly under their control. The communities of Spain produced an excess of young males who could not be supported off the land and so frequently turned bandit or mercenary. On at least one occasion Hamilcar recruited captured enemy warriors directly into his own army, since removing this element from society made any conquest more secure. The armies of the First War had been predominantiy African, but whilst large numbers of these soldiers still served, they were to be far outnumbered by Spaniards in the Second War. Most of these Spanish warriors would now serve not as mercenaries for pay, but as allied soldiers.10

  Spain gave the Barcids and, depending on the view taken of the independence of their power, Carthage a formidable military force and the wealth to support it. Though it was this resource that would allow Hannibal to prosecute the war so effectively, this does not necessarily mean that this was the reason for its creation. It could be argued that the increase of Punic military might was essentially defensive, giving her some protection against such arbitrary Roman actions as the theft of Sardinia. Clearly the loss of the war with Rome and its aftermath had been a major blow to the pride of a strong Empire. The Spanish enterprise might simply have been an attempt to reassert her independence. Yet to maintain this view it would be necessary to believe that Hannibal's attack on Saguntum was merely a statement of the revival of Punic power, not expected to provoke war with Rome. The rapidity with which Hannibal began the colossal preparations for the Italian expedition make this extremely unlikely. The Romans seem always to have been nervous about the Barcids' activity in Spain, as evidenced by the number of embassies sent there.

  The Second War was clearly a legacy of the First, which had ende
d suddenly with both sides almost equally exhausted. The Romans expected their wars to end in their own complete victory, the former enemy ceasing to present any threat usually through being absorbed as a subordinate ally. Whatever internal autonomy they preserved, they were not allowed an independent foreign policy, still less one which did not agree with Rome's interests. In 241 Carthage was too large and too distant to be absorbed by Rome in the same way that she had taken much of Italy, but even so the Romans refused to treat her as anything like an equal in the decades after the war. Sardinia was a blatant example of this attitude, forcing the Carthaginians to back down to an unjust demand, but the repeated interventions in Spain were another symptom. Whilst the Ebro treaty may not have imposed a major limit on Carthaginian expansion in Spain, it nevertheless made it clear that the Romans felt at liberty to impose such restrictions on Punic activity far from their own territory. The acceptance of some form of alliance with Saguntum reminded the Carthaginians that the Romans placed no such limits on themselves. The annual payment of the indemnity served as a continual reminder of Carthage's defeat, but this was probably completed by the mid 220s and it may have been at this time that Rome began to take an even closer interest in the Spanish Peninsula. A former enemy who appeared to be becoming an independent, rival power once again would have been perceived as a clear threat by the Romans, whatever the reality of the military situation. The interventions of Roman embassies served as a reminder to Carthage of her proper status. Until 219 the Carthaginians had always backed down in the face of Roman demands. It is highly probable that the Senate expected them to do so once again when the legation told Hannibal not to attack Saguntum, and their surprise that he disregarded this prohibition partly explains the failure of the Romans to send any aid to the city.

  From the Carthaginian perspective, there was no reason for them to behave as a subordinate ally to Rome. Their military culture was different to Rome's and did not expect the results of wars to be so final. Added to this, their actual power had not been as seriously weakened by their defeat in 241 as the Roman attitude suggested, especially once it had had time to recover from the cost of the war and the disturbances of the Mercenary Rebellion. Carthage was still a large and wealthy state, with extensive territories in Africa and a growing realm in Spain. There was no good reason for Punic citizens to think of their city as anything less than Rome's equal, and their resentment at the Romans' refusal to acknowledge this is understandable. Both states had ample resources for making war and were mutually suspicious. In those circumstances the renewal of hostilities seems less surprising.

  The Carthaginians' desire to reassert themselves as an independent power was as natural to them as it seemed threatening to the Romans. Some individuals may have consciously desired and planned for war. Hannibal was a young nobleman at the head of a powerful army and already assured of his own ability to command it. Ancient authors continually explain major wars as inspired by the lust for glory of kings, emperors and princes, and we would be rash wholly to ignore this view. It is possible that Hannibal had sought a war, and certain that he accepted it readily and prosecuted it with considerable enthusiasm. There may well have been some at Carthage who opposed the young general and who hoped for peace, but there was certainly a majority amongst the elite who saw no reason for the renewed Punic state to submit to such arrogant Roman demands. Whether or not they had acquiesced in, or had even ordered, Hannibal's activity which had provoked the crisis is impossible now to answer.11

  Preparations and Plans

  The Romans reacted very slowly to the attack on Saguntum, probably, as we have seen, in part because they expected the Carthaginians to submit to diplomatic pressure. Roman war-making was also still tied very closely to the consular year. By the time that the Senate heard that Saguntum was under siege, both of the consuls of that year were already abroad, commanding the fleet and army campaigning in Illyria. That war was as yet incomplete and even if one consul had been recalled, it would have taken some time for him to recruit a new army. It would therefore have been very late in the campaigning season before a Roman army arrived in Spain and difficult for it to achieve anything before winter halted operations. It was both more sensible and, by Roman standards, proper for the Senate to wait and allocate the major war with Carthage as the special responsibility of the consuls of 218, who would take up office in March. This was of course little comfort to the Saguntines who were left to fight to the end against an overwhelming enemy, but it is doubtful that any effective aid could have been sent.12

  The Senate's plan for the conduct of the war was simple and direct in a characteristically Roman way. The consuls were to operate separately, one going to Spain to face Hannibal, whilst the other went to Sicily from where he would launch an invasion of North Africa. In this way the enemy commander who had provoked the war was to be defeated in battle, whilst the

  Carthaginian authorities which had supported him were faced with a direct attack on their city. Direct confrontation of the enemy at their strongest points brought heavy pressure to bear on the mainstays of their opposition. Carthage had come close to folding under such pressure in 256-255 and there was no reason to believe that she would not do so again. Indeed, given the willingness of Carthage to give in to Roman threats in the decades between the wars, the Romans may even have expected her to be less resilient to actual war.

  Of the two consuls of 218, Publius Cornelius Scipio was given Spain as his province and Tiberius Sempronius Longus received Sicily and Africa. Six Roman legions were raised for the year, each consisting of 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. Both consuls were given the standard consular army of two of these legions supported by two Latin alae. In total Scipio received 14,000 allied foot and 1,600 horse, whilst Longus had 16,000 and 1,800 respectively. The remaining legions along with 10,000 allied infantry and 1,000 cavalry were sent to Cisalpine Gaul under the command of a praetor, Lucius Manlius Vulso. The willingness to alter the size of allied contingents to cope with the scale of the problem once again emphasizes that the Roman military system was not as rigid as is sometimes assumed. The Senate's appreciation of the task in hand was also reflected in the allocation of naval resources. Longus, who was to mount an invasion of Africa possibly in the face of opposition from a large Punic fleet, received 160 quinqueremes and twenty lighter ships. Scipio was far less likely to encounter a powerful enemy fleet whilst moving his army to Spain, and so was given command of sixty 'fives'. The recent war in Illyria will have ensured that the Roman navy was in good condition.13

  Before any move could be made against Carthage, a rebellion broke out in Cisalpine Gaul, provoked once again by the tribes' resentment of the incursions of Roman colonists. The Boii and Insubres drove the settlers from the as yet unfortified colonies of Placentia and Cremona, chasing them to the city of Mutina. The Gauls then sat down outside the city walls and began a blockade. Three Senatorial commissioners sent to organize the distribution of land in the new colonies were taken prisoner when they attempted to negotiate. A relief column set out under the command of the praetor Manlius Vulso, marching rapidly and taking little care to reconnoitre. It was ambushed when moving along a narrow path in heavily wooded country and suffered heavily, Livy claiming that 500 men were lost in one ambush and 700 along with six standards in a second. The battered army managed to reach a small town called Tannetum, where it too found itself under a loose siege.14

  The situation was serious and the trouble in Cisalpine Gaul was too close to Rome for the Senate to ignore until the Carthaginian war had been completed. Scipio's army had been mustering in northern Italy, preparatory to sailing to Spain, so the Senate ordered another praetor, Caius Atilius Serranus, to take one of the legions and 5,000 allied troops and relieve Manlius, an objective he achieved quickly and without opposition. Scipio was instructed to levy a new legion and fresh allied troops to replace these, but it is not altogether clear whether or not Livy's total of six legions for the year includes this unit. The resultant delay meant the
postponement of the move to Spain. In the meantime, Longus had gone ahead to Lilybaeum where he threw himself into major preparations for the African expedition.15 However, the war was not to be fought in the manner the Senate had anticipated.

  In the First War the Carthaginians had invariably responded to Roman moves rather than attempting to dictate the course of the war themselves. It had always been their opponents who escalated the conflict and pushed for a decisive result. From the beginning the Second War was to be very different and the main reason for this was the influence of one man, Hannibal Barca. In our sources Hannibal is represented as making all the key decisions to organize the initial Punic war effort in 219-218, not only in Spain but also in Africa. The Carthaginians habitually interfered very little with commanders once they had been appointed to a task, indeed often to the extent of failing to support them in subsequent operations, but the resources at the young general's immediate disposal were huge. It is at this time more than any other that Hannibal appears most like the ruler of the semi-independent principality in Spain depicted by some scholars.

  The war had begun with a local dispute in Spain, the Carthaginians refusing to acknowledge any longer the restrictions the Romans had imposed upon their power there. The Romans clearly expected them to remain there and fight a defensive war to protect their territory, much like the one they had fought in Sicily. With the forces at his disposal Hannibal was in a strong position to meet any invasion. He would in fact have greatly outnumbered the single consular army which Scipio was to lead into the Peninsula and ought easily to have defeated it if it could be forced into a battle. Yet the experience of the First War had shown that destroying a Roman fleet or army simply meant that another was raised to replace it. The dogged persistence which Rome had shown in the face of horrendous losses made it unlikely that they would quickly give up. The longer that a war continued in Spain the less solid the Barcid conquests would seem. Many of the tribes had been overawed by Punic military might, but their loyalty might not last when another army remained in the area, its leaders doubtless making every effort to seduce the Spanish chieftains. The more traditional Carthaginian mode of war-making, enduring an enemy's onslaught till its power began to dissipate, offered at best the prospect of a prolonged stalemate and at worst defeat when the opponent was Rome. Hannibal rejected the defensive option from the beginning and resolved that every effort should be made actively to defeat Rome. Since heavy losses abroad had in the past done little to weaken her power, Rome must be confronted and beaten on her own territory, in Italy.