The Fall of Carthage Page 20

  In many ways, the invasion of Italy was a markedly 'Roman' enterprise, bringing heavy force to bear directly against an enemy's strength. In that sense the Romans perhaps should have been less surprised than they were when Hannibal chose this option, but the past record of Punic war-making did not suggest such a bold venture likely, especially in view of the practical difficulties involved. A seaborne invasion was scarcely feasible in 218. Without bases in Sicily, even southern Italy was at the very limit of operational range for a fleet of galleys operating from North Africa, and Punic naval power in Spain was not great. In either case a landing on a hostile shore, probably in the face of opposition from the powerful Roman navy, was a highly risky venture and it is doubtful that a large enough army could have been landed to operate with any effectiveness.16 This left the option of a land invasion from Spain, but the difficulties were formidable. Such an expedition involved a march of hundreds of miles through tribes which were at best neutral and potentially hostile, and the crossing of the major obstacle formed by the Alps. Once in Italy the Punic army would have no base, no supplies and be faced by steadily increasing numbers of enemies. It was a bold venture and our familiarity with the story should not blind us to the shock which the Romans must have received when they learned that this was precisely what Hannibal had done.

  After the fall of Saguntum Hannibal withdrew to New Carthage for the winter, lavishly rewarding his soldiers with a proportion of the spoils from the city. His Spanish troops were allowed to disperse to their homes and families, having orders to reassemble by the beginning of spring. Correctly anticipating the Romans' course of action, Hannibal took measures to bolster the defences of both Africa and Spain. The figures for the forces involved are unusually precise by ancient standards and Polybius tells us that they came from an inscription erected by order of Hannibal himself during his time in Italy. Africa received a force of 1,200 Iberian horse and 13,850 foot, supported by 870 of the wild slingers from the Balearic Islands. A small detachment of these troops were stationed in Carthage itself, along with 4,000 Libyan foot, who in addition provided hostages for the good behaviour of their home communities. The bulk of the force was garrisoned in the area of Libya known as Metagonia. Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal was given command of the Spanish province, continuing the tradition of government by the Barcid family. Hasdrubal seems to have been an able man and certainly held the trust of his brother, but the personal nature of loyalty amongst the Spanish tribes may well have been another reason for this decision. In addition to the allies which could be levied in the province, Hasdrubal received a strong force of African soldiers. Altogether he had twenty-one elephants, 2,550 cavalry (consisting of 450 Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans, 300 Spanish Ilergetes, and 1,800 Numidians from four different tribes), and 12,650 infantry, mostly Libyans, but including 300 Ligurians and 500 Balearic slingers. Naval support was provided by a small fleet of fifty 'fives', two 'fours' and five 'threes', but only a proportion of these, thirty-two quinqueremes and all the triremes, were properly manned and ready. The exchange of soldiers levied in Spain and Africa was considered a good way of ensuring their loyalty, making it harder for them to desert and return to their homes.17

  The bulk of preparations were concerned with the Italian expedition, massing a huge total of 12,000 cavalry and 90,000 infantry according to Polybius. Sadly he does not go into any detail about their composition, although it is likely that most of the nationalities and troop types in the other forces were represented. The bulk were evidently from the Spanish Peninsula and later events make it clear that they included representatives from all the main peoples of the region, Iberians, Lusitanians and Celtiberians. These tribal peoples provided good close order cavalry and both close order and open order foot. Then there was a strong contingent of African regular infantry, well drilled and disciplined, Numidian light horse and perhaps some foot, and a corps of war elephants, thirty-seven in number according to Appian.18 This army was far larger than any force recorded for the Carthaginians during the century and it is likely that many of the soldiers, and particularly the Spanish, had been raised relatively recently. The core of the army were the troops who had won the many wars of conquest in Spain under Hannibal, his father and his brother-in-law. They were led by a staff of senior officers whom they knew and trusted. Together these men had welded the warriors of many disparate races into a highly efficient fighting force which, for its numbers, was probably better than anything else in existence in the Mediterranean world at that time.

  This huge force of troops by the standards of the day required massive logistic support to feed, clothe and equip itself. This must have occupied

  Hannibal and his officers throughout the winter and probably for many months or even years before. It has been suggested that Hannibal's Spanish campaigns from 221 had as one of their main aims the capture of some of the more fertile regions of the Peninsula to ensure a grain supply for his planned Italian expedition.19 There were many other arrangements which also could not have been completed swiftly. Men were sent to gather as much information as possible about the proposed route for the march to Italy and in particular such major obstacles as the Alps. Representatives went amongst the tribes along the route and especially those of Cisalpine Gaul, seeking their support against Rome once the army arrived in Italy. The recent memory of heavy defeats inflicted by the Romans since 225 ensured that such approaches met a with warm reception. Having allies beyond the Alps, Hannibal could anticipate securing supplies of food as well as adding many warriors to his army. Polybius tells us that the emissaries had returned by the end of the winter assuring him of the welcome he would receive. This means that at the very latest these must have left as soon as Saguntum fell and it is distinctly possible that they went before. All of these arrangements suggest that the Italian expedition, and thus the war with Rome, had long been pondered and perhaps actively prepared by the young Punic general. The expectation of Gallic assistance as part of the plan has been seen by some as proving that the concept cannot have been devised before 225 and therefore at the earliest was created by Hasdrubal rather than Hamilcar. However, perhaps all this meant was that an earlier plan became more practical from that date. Once again without accounts from the Carthaginian perspective we can only speculate about all of this. Hannibal undertook one other preparation during the winter, perhaps as important by ancient, if not modern, standards as all the others: travelling to Gades to sacrifice at the Temple of Melquart - Herakles, a deity associated with his family and depicted on some of the coins they issued.20 There he fulfilled vows taken earlier and made fresh ones for the success of his expedition.

  What was Hannibal's objective in invading Italy? This topic has long been the subject of fierce debate, often revolving around his decision not to march on the city of Rome itself when he apparently had the opportunity in 217 and 216. The most commonly held view now is that Hannibal's plan was never to capture the city of Rome itself, but to weaken her power by persuading as many of her Italian and Latin allies as possible to defect. Therefore, when Hannibal negotiated an alliance against Rome with Philip II of Macedon, the terms clearly anticipated that Rome would still exist in a weakened state after their joint victory. Similarly, Livy tells us that after Cannae in 216, Hannibal addressed his Roman prisoners and claimed that he was not fighting to destroy them, but 'for honour and power'.21 The answer is a good deal simpler than the controversy over this would suggest. Hannibal attacked Italy to win the war. It was rarely possible in this period for one side to destroy its enemy utterly in war, unless the states involved were very small and one had an overwhelmingly advantage. Later, in 146, Rome possessed such an advantage over Carthage and was able after a hard struggle to destroy her as a political entity. Normally wars, particularly wars between states as large as Carthage or Rome, ended when one side lost the willingness to fight on, not the ability to do so. Then, as Carthage had nearly done in 255 and had actually done in 241, they acknowledged defeat and accepted peace terms which refl
ected this. The objective of any war was to force the enemy into a position where they would give in. The method was perhaps to win one or several pitched battles, to capture enemy cities, ravage their fields and burn their villages, or most often a combination of all these things. All the more powerful states had absorbed many smaller communities as subordinate allies of varying willingness. A demonstration of the weakness of their masters at the hands of an invader was likely to prompt defections, each group hoping to side with the eventual winners in any conflict. Most city states and tribes were riven by factional divides, who were often willing to side with an external power willing to give them control of their own people. In this way the Sicilian cities had flocked to join Rome after her initial successes in 264, whilst in 240 the Libyans had rapidly sided with the rebellious mercenaries. During the course of this war the tribes of Spain proved ever ready to abandon their alliance and join the side which appeared to be winning. A state seeing its allies and subjects breaking away would be under even more pressure to compromise and accept defeat. Therefore, it was not unreasonable to believe that, if Hannibal could reach Italy and begin winning victories there, Rome's allies would begin to waver. Hannibal was not adopting a novel strategy, and there is no need to claim that he appreciated that Rome's real strength lay in her network of allies. He was simply fighting a war in the normal way. What was unusual about his plans, at least in comparison to recent Carthaginian warfare, was the willingness to act so aggressively and attempt to force a decision in the war.22

  Before following the Carthaginian army on their epic march to Italy, it is worth pausing to consider what sort of man their commander was. Hannibal was about 28-years-old when he left New Carthage in the spring of 218. It is not clear whether he had remained in Spain since his father took him there at the age of 9,23 but he certainly had served on many campaigns there and was already an experienced soldier. His education seems to have included a strong Greek element and he was to take Greek historians with him on his expedition. Our sources are unanimous in admiring his military virtues. For Polybius he personified in every respect the ideal of Hellenistic generalship, planning operations carefully and acting with caution, but willing to be very bold when the situation required it. Livy depicts him more in accordance with literary cliches of his day. Therefore, like the best Roman commanders he was as proficient with his personal weapons as he was in directing the movements of an entire army. On campaign he shared the physical hardships of his men, sleeping in the open wrapped only in a military cloak, and wearing the same clothes as the ordinary soldiers, although Livy does note that his equipment and horses were of such high quality as to make him conspicuous. Physically brave and inclined to lead from close to the fighting, he had the moral courage to take decisions and adhere to them.24

  Even his enemies acknowledged his military genius, though they were inclined to accuse him of Punic perfidiousness, perhaps because he had so often outwitted them. They also believed him to be cruel, although a similar charge could be laid against most of the 'Great Captains' of antiquity and Polybius suggested that some of the more brutal acts attributed to him may in fact have been committed by one of his subordinates, another Hannibal, nicknamed Monomachus, which means 'fighter of single combats' or 'duellist'. This man is supposed to have shocked a meeting of senior officers called by Hannibal to plan the invasion of Italy by suggesting that they solve their supply problems by training the soldiers to eat human flesh. Polybius also believed that men may be forced to commit acts of great cruelty in spite of an otherwise good nature, if a difficult military or political situation made such actions necessary. Polybius seemed to accept the charge repeated by most of our sources that Hannibal was overly avaricious. However, the sources he gives for this, namely a conversation with King Masinissa, the Numidian leader who defected to the Romans later in the war and had little love for his former Punic masters, and the opinion of Hannibal's political rivals who forced him into exile from Carthage in the years after the war, do not inspire confidence. Hannibal's apparent thirst for money may well have been necessary throughout the Italian campaign to support his army and pay his soldiers.25

  The true character of Hannibal eludes us. None of our sources provide the equivalent of the anecdotes told about the childhood and family life of the important Greek and Roman politicians of the era, many of whom were the subject of detailed biographies. We can say a good deal about what

  Hannibal did during his career, and often understand how he did it, but we can say virtually nothing with any certainty about what sort of man he was. As with so much else about Carthage and its leaders, there are so many things that we simply do not know, that even our sources probably did not understand. Was Hannibal for instance a Hellenized aristocrat who dreamed of copying and surpassing the great expeditions of Alexander or Pyrrhus, or did he remain very much the Punic nobleman with a very different set of beliefs and ambitions? Much as we try to understand Hannibal, he will always remain an enigma.

  The March to Italy

  The actual route Hannibal's army followed on its march to Italy has long fascinated historians. Even in Livy's day, there was a fierce dispute over which pass the Carthaginians had taken over the Alps. For many people, tracing the route has become a passion, and academics and ex-soldiers, including no less a figure than Napoleon, who himself campaigned in the area, have indulged in endless speculation, often spending many days travelling over the land itself. Their conclusions have varied enormously and unfortunately the nature of our sources makes it impossible to resolve these disputes. I do not intend to discuss this topic since it would be impossible to do it justice in the framework of a treatment of all three Punic Wars, in addition to which I do not possess the intimate knowledge of the ground of the best contributors in this field. In this section we shall simply trace the major events of Hannibal's march, mentioning only in passing the most favoured theories concerning the location of these episodes.26

  Hannibal set out from New Carthage in late spring 218 and moved towards the River Ebro, a distance of about 325 miles (2,600 stades). His huge army probably advanced in several smaller groupings to relieve congestion on the main routes and ease the supply situation, for they crossed the river in three separate columns at different places. Although the Ebro treaty had earlier been of great significance, war between Rome and Carthage was already certain by this point, and the crossing merely confirmed this. Hannibal led his troops in a series of lightning expeditions against the tribes between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. Speed was essential if he was to reach Italy before the end of the year, so Hannibal drove his soldiers hard and was willing to accept a high casualty rate, taking fortified towns by direct assault and fighting a number of actions. After perhaps a month of intense fighting, at least four tribes had been overawed by this display of Punic military might and the violence of the onslaught. Yet the area was certainly not conquered and, like many other parts of Spain subdued by the Barcids, would remain peaceful only so long as the Carthaginians were perceived to be strong. To control the region Hannibal left an officer named Hanno, giving him a force of 1,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry.27

  Although it has sometimes been suggested that Hannibal originally planned to remain west of the mountains to await the anticipated Roman invasion of Spain and only pushed on towards Italy when the Romans were delayed by the Gallic rebellion, this is not supported by our sources.28 Instead he made a few quick alterations to his force and pushed on through the Pyrenees. All his heavy baggage was to be left behind with Hanno to allow the unencumbered army to move faster. It was now late summer and the harvest was due or already gathered in the lands the army was to pass through, allowing Hannibal to reduce the amount of food and forage carried in his pack train and instead live off the land. The great size of the army had been useful in the rapid campaign beyond the Ebro, but such numbers would prove hard to feed and difficult to control on the longer march to Italy, so Hannibal planned to take only the best soldiers. About 10,000 Spanish warri
ors were released from service and sent back to their homes. Some of these, and perhaps many others, had deserted of their own accord; one contingent of 3,000 Carpetani are mentioned as doing so during the crossing of the Pyrenees. By the time Hannibal crossed into Gaul he had an army of9,000 cavalry and around 50,000 infantrymen, still large by the standards of the day, but more manageable and highly experienced. Even with the other detachments mentioned by our sources, the army's numbers had shrunk by some 20,000 men. Some of these were doubtless casualties in the operations beyond the Ebro, but the majority were probably stragglers and deserters. If, as seems likely, much of the army consisted of recently raised and inexperienced troops, many of these may well have lacked both the enthusiasm and the stamina to undertake the long marches Hannibal expected from his soldiers.29