The Fall of Carthage Read online

  The rapid demise of the European empires following the end of the Second World War led to an almost equally rapid condemnation of all that they had stood for amongst the new generations of historians, an unquestioned assumption that empires were, by their very nature, wrong. These scholars emphasized the greed and brutality of the imperial powers, the oppression of indigenous peoples and the destruction of their rich cultures. Eventually ancient historians began to examine Roman imperialism from a similarly critical standpoint. The assumption that Roman war-making was primarily defensive had always lacked plausibility in view of the eventual conquest of most of the known world. Some emphasized the economic motivation for conquest, in particular the acquisition of large numbers of slaves to work the great estates purchased by the noble families from the profits of successful wars. Others concentrated on the elements within Roman society which made them prone to expansion, focusing in particular on the senatorial quest for glory which could best be won by leading the armies of the state in a successful foreign war, so that each year a new set of magistrates were installed who were eager to wage war. There were also advantages and profits to be gained by all classes in Roman society through military service. Rome's network of alliances throughout Italy, for almost all of whom the chief bond was the obligation to provide soldiers to serve the Romans in war, has also been seen as encouraging further expansion. According to this theory the only means for the Romans to confirm the loyalty of their allies was to fight constant wars. That the Romans were frequently willing to fight wars and extend their power, even if not the physical extent of their territory, is undeniable, but the emphasis on Roman aggression can be taken too far. Too often this is studied in isolation with little account being taken of the targets of imperialism, many of whom were themselves highly aggressive. It has recently been pointed out that Roman expansion did not occur at a steady, constant rate. Its intensity varied immensely, with bursts of expansion being followed by relative lulls, when fewer wars were fought and only a small proportion of citizens enrolled to serve in the legions. Nor can the fear of strong neighbours entirely be dismissed as a motive for some of Rome's wars, even if with hindsight we may suggest that a people or state were not a genuine rival to Rome's power. If the Romans were as aggressive as some scholars have suggested, it would be unsurprising if they in turn expected other peoples to behave in a similar way and treated them accordingly.12

  The desire for glory on the part of a Roman consul was the main reason why he incited the people with promises of profit and persuaded them to vote in favour of aiding the Mamertines. This is a clear case where the factors within the Roman political system seen as favouring expansion did come into play and were the prime cause of a war. However, at least one scholar has gone further and argued that a clash between Rome and Carthage became inevitable after the Roman conquest of southern Italy, citing the establishment of colonies in Paestum and Cola in 273, the alliance with Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt and the acquisition of a supply of timber ideal for shipbuilding when much of the Sila forest was confiscated from the Bruttians. Yet, as supporters of this theory admit, there were also opportunities for potential Roman expansion in northern Italy. It is dangerous to imply too high a level of forward planning on the part of the Roman Senate. Perhaps we might fairly say that after the defeat of Tarentum the potential for a clash between Rome and Carthage existed, but not claim inevitability. Once again it is worth recalling that it is highly unlikely that anyone at Rome expected more than a brief confrontation with the Carthaginians in 264.13

  Once the Romans had made the decision to send an expedition to Sicily there was a long delay before they could actually move. It took time to enrol and muster a consular army and in addition to this, triremes and pentekonters to carry them across the Straits of Messina from Rhegium had to be requested from Rome's naval allies at Locri, Tarentum, Elea and Naples. In the meantime the Carthaginians moved a squadron of their galleys to a position near Cape Pelorias, from where they could observe the Straits and oppose any ships trying to cross. The precise chronology is once again unclear, but at some stage the small Carthaginian garrison of Messana was evicted from the city by the Mamertines. Their commander Hanno was subsequently crucified by his own side for this failure. Dio tells the story of how an advance party of Romans led by the tribune Gaius Claudius preceded the main force to Rhegium. Attempts to cross the sea in daylight were intercepted by the Carthaginian ships and repulsed. However, eager to avoid open conflict and perhaps confident that a display of naval power would deter the Romans from the folly of campaigning on an island without the support of a fleet, the Carthaginians returned the ships and prisoners they had taken. Claudius twice crossed at night in a small boat and began negotiations with the Mamertines, encouraging them with the direct promise of Roman support to evict the Carthaginian garrison. Finally Claudius was able to bring his main force over under cover of darkness.14

  Polybius mentions none of this, and it may all be a later Annalistic invention or a confused version of the actions of Appius Claudius, for the coincidence of the tribune's name is highly suspicious. Appius Claudius also had difficulty in crossing the Straits in the face of the Punic ships. At a later point in the narrative Polybius mentions that one Carthaginian quinquereme ran aground and was captured when it too recklessly attempted to head off the Roman ships. Finally, Appius Claudius also managed to bring most of his force across to Messana at night. All sources attest to a good deal of negotiation between the various parties during these early stages. Dio records the famous threat made by Hanno to Gaius Claudius following the return of the prisoners and captured ships, urging them to seek peace rather than confront Carthaginian naval might and claiming that he would not allow them even 'to bathe their hands in the sea'. In Diodorus' version, Appius Claudius sent envoys to Hiero and the Carthaginians stressing the Romans' need to fulfil their fides (faith) to their allies the Mamertines. The Romans were understandably condemned as self-seeking, the need to maintain an obligation to the criminal Mamertines dismissed. The only concrete result of these rounds of negotiation was the alliance between Hiero's Syracuse and the Carthaginians to capture Messana and, presumably, oppose Roman intervention. The ease with which Hiero agreed to co-operate with the Carthaginians who had so recently duped him over Messana emphasized the degree to which all parties were acting out of self-interest.15

  Hiero led an army from Syracuse which camped near a Carthaginian force and began the blockade of Messana. When negotiations had failed, the Romans made the next move, Appius Claudius attacking Hiero's camp. A sharp encounter ensued before the Romans were victorious, remaining in command of the field and despoiling the dead, an important mark of success in the ancient world. Hiero abandoned the siege and withdrew back to Syracuse. Polybius righriy demonstrated the implausibility of Philinus' claim that it was Hiero and not the Romans who won this action, but Zonaras does claim that the Syracusan cavalry initially defeated their Roman counterparts and that the day was only saved by the legionary infantry. Given the difficulties of transporting horses by sea and the specific problems encountered by Claudius in running the Punic blockade, it is quite possible that the Roman horse was not numerous, but it is also worth recalling that historically the Syracusan cavalry had a good reputation, unlike the city's hoplites. On the next day Claudius attacked the Carthaginians at dawn and drove them off. Zonaras says that after an initial repulse the Carthaginians pursued carelessly and were in turn routed by the Romans. It is highly unlikely that either of these actions was anything more than a large skirmish, but through them the Romans had broken the league around Messana.16

  Claudius followed up his success by making a foray down towards Syracuse, raiding and devastating its territory. It is unlikely that this was anything more than a demonstration of force, since he had neither time nor resources to contemplate the siege of, or assault on, the city. Zonaras claims that several skirmishes were fought with Hiero's soldiers, before Claudius withdrew, his term of office having
expired. It is notable that despite his successes, Claudius was not awarded a triumph on his return to Rome. It is possible that this was a result of personal unpopularity in the Senate, but more likely that it is confirmation of the small scale of the actions he had fought. In 263 the Romans decided to send both consuls, Marcus Valerius Maximus and Manius Otacilius Crassus, to Sicily, each at the head of the standard consular army of two legions and two alae, so that something like 40,000 Roman soldiers would campaign in the area. This display of force persuaded many Sicilian cities to defect from Carthaginian or Syracusan control and others were captured by surprise assaults. The attitude of most cities throughout the war was to be openly pragmatic, seeking to ally themselves with the strongest power as the only way to prevent the devastation of their fields and homes. There is little sign of much affection for any of the sides in the conflict. Marcus Valerius Maximus gained the most credit for ending the war with Hiero and celebrated a triumph in the next year. It is possible that he received the cognomen Messala as a result of winning a victory on behalf of Messana.17

  Syracuse was the main target for the Roman offensive and clearly perceived as the prime enemy. Faced with the overwhelming force of both consuls, Hiero decided to make peace. His approach was readily accepted by the Romans, whose large army was already facing major supply problems. In part this was a result of the continued Carthaginian blockade of the Straits, their only active participation in this phase of the campaign, but also a product of the Romans' unpreparedness for fighting a campaign so far away. A direct assault on a large and well-defended city was always dangerous and the army could not have fed itself for the duration of a long siege, even if they could have preserved a blockade and prevented supplies from reaching the city, which was probably impossible without a Roman fleet to seal off the harbour. By the terms of the subsequent treaty Hiero became a friend and ally of Rome, returned without ransom all the Roman prisoners in his hands, presumably taken in the skirmishes with Claudius, and paid them 100 talents. The alliance, confirmed in perpetuity in 248, allowed Hiero to control an independent Syracuse and extensive territories, ruling in a way that earned praise from Polybius which, he claims, was reflected by Hiero's Greek subjects. Hiero's loyalty to Rome was to remain staunch even at the lowest ebb of their fortunes and without his aid, in particular in ensuring the supply of provisions to the Roman armies, the campaigns in Sicily would not have been possible.18

  Syracuse was the weakest of the three states, which explains Hiero's easy shift in alliance from Carthage to Rome. In this way he achieved his original objective of removing the threat of raiding by the Mamertines, even if he could not conquer the city. The short-lived alliance between Syracuse and Carthage had always been a strange one, given the fact that they were natural rivals and the recent Carthaginian insertion of a garrison into Messana. It is interesting to speculate, but impossible to know, what they expected to happen if they had taken Messana together. The Carthaginians' actions were merely a continuation of their long-term attempt to dominate Sicily. They disliked the prospect of a reinvigorated Syracuse capturing Messana, but were even less willing to see the Romans establish themselves on the island. In the past the Carthaginians had endured the onslaught of various foreign armies which had come to Sicily to fight them on behalf of the Greek cities, the most recent example being Pyrrhus. Though such leaders had achieved notable successes the Carthaginians had always weathered the storm and eventually repulsed them. Whatever the details of earlier treaties, the Roman landing in Sicily was a direct challenge to Carthaginian power in an area where they had long had a presence. The contrast between Carthage's great naval power and Rome's lack of a fleet can only have encouraged them in their belief that the Romans would have extreme difficulty in maintaining a presence in Sicily. There seemed no reason for them to admit the Romans to the island in the first place, or to believe that the initial reverse was anything other than temporary.

  Syracuse, Carthage and Rome all acted out of self-interest, but it is important not to judge their actions by modern standards. It was considered proper in the Graeco-Roman world for states to seek to increase their hegemony over others, a view which did not conflict with the importance of freedom as a political ideal. Yet Rome had no tradition of a presence in Sicily to mitigate their opportunistic actions and the Mamertines were clearly undeserving allies. Both Rome and Carthage were supremely self-confident, probably rather naively inclined to assume that their strength was great enough to overawe any opposition, or swiftly overcome it if force proved necessary. It was in this light mood that they were to enter upon twenty-three years of war.

  CHAPTER 3

  The Land War

  THE OPERATIONS OF armies and fleets were intimately related in the ancient world, especially in a conflict like the First Punic War when much of the righting occurred on or around islands or near coastlines. However, it is easier to understand the events of the war if we deal separately with the actions of the navies and armies involved, and concentrate in turn on the activity in each theatre of operations. This chapter will describe the campaigns fought on land.

  Sicily, 262-258 BC

  Syracuse provided the Roman armies with a secure base for their operations, where grain, fodder and other supplies could be massed. Messana was now secure and the ostensible objectives for Rome's going to war had been achieved, but our sources do not suggest that either side attempted to begin peace negotiations. The Carthaginians saw no reason why their initial reverses should force them to accept a permanent Roman presence in Sicily and began to build up a powerful army for use there. Large numbers of mercenaries were enlisted in Spain, whilst other contingents were provided by the Gauls and Ligurians. For the Romans, hostilities could not end until the Carthaginians admitted defeat and were willing to come to terms favourable to Rome, as Hiero had done. The prospects of glory and plunder from the rich Sicilian cities which had first attracted the Romans to the area provided a further incentive for continuing the struggle. Polybius claims that after the capitulation of Hiero the Romans had reduced their forces from four to two legions, trusting to the king's aid to ease their supply problems. Subsequently, in reaction to the Carthaginians' preparations, both consuls and four legions were dispatched to Sicily in 262.1

  The Carthaginians intended to use Agrigentum (also known by the Greek name Acragas), roughly midway along the coast of Sicily nearest to Africa, as their main base. However, by the summer of 262 when the Romans moved against the city few, if any, of the newly raised troops had arrived. The consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, marched together, their combined armies theoretically giving them around 40,000 men, and arrived outside the city at harvest time (probably in about June). Hannibal, son of Gisgo, the commander at Agrigentum, had gathered many people from the surrounding area within the city walls, so that Polybius tells us that its population had swollen to 50,000, but his garrison appears to have been relatively small. His refusal to contest the area outside the city walls may well have been interpreted by the Roman consuls as weakness, for, at least in the western Mediterranean, it was normal for a confident defender to fight for some time outside his fortifications even against a numerically superior attacking force. Once the Romans had built their camp about a mile from the city, a large proportion of the army dispersed to harvest the ripened crops in the surrounding fields. For an army recruited mainly from small farmers and agricultural labourers, the task must have been a familiar one. Nevertheless it is striking that once again the logistical arrangements of a Roman army seem to have been inadequate. Roth, in his excellent study of the army's logistics, argues that the army at this time was simply unprepared to feed large forces campaigning so far afield for long periods of time.2 It had been very rare for four legions to take the field together in the past. Only the small picket placed outside the camp, following a practice which was to remain standard in the Roman army for several centuries to come, was composed of formed and equipped troops. These men were oath-bound n
ot to leave their position and the Roman army's harsh discipline punished with death any man who did so.3

  Hannibal seized the opportunity and launched a vigorous sally. The foragers, scattered and probably largely unarmed, could offer no effective resistance and fled. A major Roman disaster appeared likely as Carthaginian troops advanced on the Roman camp. The only resistance came from the picket guarding the Roman camp and these men, despite being heavily outnumbered, put up a fierce fight. The Roman losses were heavy, but in the end they routed the attacking troops, defeated another group which had begun to penetrate the camp and pursued them all back to the city. Both sides were chastened by this experience, and their behaviour was subsequently more circumspect. Hannibal could not risk further losses to his garrison and became reluctant to risk further attacks, whilst the Romans ceased to underestimate their enemy and in future took care to forage in a more organized way, posting larger numbers to troops as a covering force.