Cannae Read online

  APPENDIX 2

  Casualties

  A: HANNIBAL’S ARMY

  (i) Polybius (3. 117. 6)

  − c. 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spanish and Africans, and 200 cavalry: Total: 5,700 (11.4% of the army).

  (ii) Livy (22. 52. 6)

  − c. 8,000 ‘of his [Hannibal’s] bravest men’ (16% of the army).

  B: THE ROMAN ARMY

  (i) Polybius (3. 117. 1–3)

  Killed:

  c. 70,000 infantry and presumably c. 5,630 cavalry either killed or captured

  Captured:

  c. 10,000 infantry

  Escaped:

  3,000 infantry and 370 cavalry

  Total:

  c. 85,630 killed or captured

  Since Polybius gives the Roman strength as 6,000 horse and 80,000 foot before the battle his total of 89,000 for casualties and survivors must be questioned.

  (ii) Livy

  Killed:

  45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry (22. 49. 15)

  Captured:

  3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry on the battlefield (22. 49. 19)

  2,000 men who had fled into the ruins of Cannae (22. 49. 13)

  6,400 in the smaller camp (22. 49. 13, 50. 11)

  5,800 in the larger camp (22. 49. 13, 52. 4)

  or 6,400 if Livy included in the total of fugitives from this camp the 600 men led by the tribune Sempronius.

  Total prisoners

  = 18,700 (or possibly 19,300).

  Escaped:

  50 with Varro to Venusia immediately after the battle (22. 49. 14)

  4,500 subsequently joined Varro at Venusia (22. 54. 1)

  10,000 to Canusium (22. 54. 4)

  Total survivors

  = 14,550

  Sub Totals:

  Killed

  = 48,200

  Captured

  = 18,700 (or 19,300)

  Escaped

  = 14,550

  Total

  = 81,450 (or 82,050)

  Livy rounds up the number of dead at Cannae from 48,200 to 50,000 in several speeches (22. 59. 5, 60. 14, 25. 6. 13).

  (iii) Other sources:

  (a) Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 16

  = 50,000 killed

  (b) Appian, Hann. 25

  = 50,000 killed

  (c) Eutropius 3. 10

  = 40,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry killed

  (d) Quintilian 8. 6. 26

  = 60,000 killed

  C: ROMAN OFFICERS

  (i) Known to be with the army:

  2 consuls

  1 proconsul

  2 quaestors

  48 tribunes

  (ii) Killed:

  1 consul

  −

  Lucius Aemilius Paullus (consul 219, 216)

  1 proconsul

  −

  Cnaeus Servilius Geminus (consul 217)

  2 quaestors

  −

  Lucius Atilius and Lucius Furius Bibaculus

  29 tribunes

  −

  including Marcus Minucius Rufus (consul 221)

  80 senators

  −

  including some men who were due for enrolment, but had not yet been admitted

  (iii) Known survivors:

  1 consul

  − Caius Terentius Varro (consul 216)

  6 (7?) tribunes

  − Cnaeus Lentulus

  − Publius Sempronius Tuditanus

  − Quintus Fabius Maximus (consul 213)

  − Lucius Publicius Bibulus

  − Publius Cornelius Scipio (consul 205, 194)

  − Appius Claudius Pulcher (consul 212)

  All of these men are named by Livy (22. 49. 6, 50. 6, 53. 1–2). Another tribune, Cnaeus Octavius, is said by the late first century AD source Frontinus to have escaped with Tuditanus (Strategemata 4. 5. 7). If there were eight legions at Cannae and all had their full complement of six tribunes then nineteen survived.

  Glossary

  ala (pl. alae): A contingent supplied for the army by Rome’s Italian allies. It had roughly the same number of infantry as a legion, but two to three times as many cavalry.

  centurion: The commander of a century in a Roman legion. Some of these men were elected, others appointed to the post.

  century: The basic administrative sub-unit of the Roman legion. Each contained from thirty to eighty men and was led by a centurion. There were sixty centuries in each legion.

  cohort: The most important sub-unit of an ala. The size and internal organization of the cohort are unknown.

  consul: Rome’s most senior magistrates were the two consuls who held office for a year beginning in March. The consuls were allocated all the most important tasks required by the Republic.

  decurion: The commander of a file of ten Roman cavalrymen. There were three decurions in each turma.

  dictator: In times of crisis the Roman Republic could choose to appoint a single magistrate, or dictator, with supreme power. His term of office was set at six months and could not be renewed.

  equites: The highest social and economic class in Roman society, the equites, or ‘knights’, provided the cavalry of the legions.

  hastatus (pl. hastati): The first line of heavy infantry in the legion, recruited from the younger men.

  legion: The most important unit in the Roman army, a legion consisted of cavalry, light infantry, and three lines of close order infantry. There were at least 4,000 foot and 200 horse in each legion, but this number was often increased.

  Magister Equitum: The second in command to a dictator.

  maniple: The basic tactical unit of the heavy infantry in a legion consisted of two centuries. It was commanded by the centurion of the right-hand maniple if both centurions were present. There were ten maniples in each of the three lines.

  optio (pl. optiones): The centurion’s second in command, the optio traditionally stood at the rear of the century.

  pilum (pl. pila): The heavy javelin which equipped the hastati and principes.

  praetor: The four praetors elected each year were junior to the consuls and held less important military commands, as well as exercising judicial authority.

  prefect: Three prefects commanded each ala. Their role was probably similar to that of the tribunes in a legion.

  princeps (pl. principes): The second line of close order infantry in a Roman legion were recruited from men in the prime of life.

  quaestor: Junior magistrates who oversaw the Republic’s finances and acted as second in command to the consuls.

  scutum (pl. scuta): A shield, especially the heavy oval body shield carried by Roman legionaries.

  socii: The Latin and Italian allies of the Roman Republic. All were obliged to provide men or other support for Roman armies.

  suffes (pl. suffetes): The two suffetes were the senior magistrates of the Carthaginian Republic. However, unlike the Roman consuls, they did not hold military commands. Hannibal was elected suffes after the Second Punic War.

  triarius (pl. triarii): The infantry of the third line of a Roman legion, drawn from the oldest and most experienced soldiers.

  tribune: The six tribunes were the senior officers of the legion. Command was held by a pair of tribunes in turn.

  turma: The basic tactical unit of the Roman cavalry. It consisted of thirty men, including three decurions.

  veles (pl. velites): The light infantry of the Roman legion, recruited from the poorest citizens and those too young to serve with the hastati.

  Notes

  CHAPTER 1

  1. For an overview of the Mediterranean world in this period see A. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy. Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 20–83; for Carthage, its history and culture see G. Picard and C. Picard, Carthage (rev. ed.: London, 1987), and S. Lancel, Carthage (Oxford, 1995); for Rome’s origins, society and history see T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London, 1995), and M. Crawford, The Roman Republic (Glasgow, 1978).

  2. On the First Punic War see J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London,
1995), B. Caven, The Punic Wars (New York, 1980), pp. 1–84, and A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2000), pp. 65–140.

  3. On the causes of the Second Punic War see J. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 1–28, Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 143–166, and especially J. Rich, ‘The origins of the Second Punic War’, in T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), pp. 1–37.

  4. Sosylus Hannibal’s tutor in Greek, Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 13. 3.

  5. Hannibal’s oath, Polybius 3. 11. 5–12. 4.

  6. The size of Hannibal’s army, Polybius 3. 35. 1, Appian, Hannibalic War 1. 4. For a detailed discussion of the army’s size at various stages of the campaign see Appendix 1. For a fuller discussion of Punic strategy see Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 130–133, 152–153.

  7. Hannibal’s character, Polybius 9. 22. 1–26. 11, Livy 22. 4. 2–5. 2.

  8. For more detailed accounts and discussions of the campaigns in 218–217 BC, see Lazenby (1978), pp. 29–73, Caven (1980), pp. 98–132, and Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 167–196.

  9. For a perceptive discussion of the ‘Fabian strategy’ see P. Erdkamp, ‘Polybius, Livy and the Fabian Strategy’, Ancient Society 23 (1992), pp. 127–147.

  CHAPTER 2

  1. For good introductions to the development of the Roman army see L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (London, 1984), E. Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army and Allies (Berkeley, 1976), A. Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare (London, 2000), and F. Adcock, The Roman Art of War under the Republic (Cambridge, 1960).

  2. Polybius’ description of the army, 6. 19. 1–42. 6; for a discussion see Walbank, Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 697–723. The basic study of the evidence for the early Roman army is E. Rawson, ‘The literary sources for the pre-Marian Roman Army’, Papers of the British School at Rome 39 (1971), pp. 13–31. For the ‘reform’ of 211, see the unconvincing arguments in M. Samuels, ‘The Reality of Cannae’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), pp. 7–31.

  3. Polybius 6. 25. 1–11; on the saddle see P. Connolly, ‘The Roman saddle’, in M. Dawson (ed.), Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War. BAR 336 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 7–27, and A. Hyland, Training the Roman Cavalry (Gloucester, 1993), pp. 45–51.

  4. Polybius 6. 24. 1–9.

  5. Polybius 6. 23. 1–16; for weapons and armour see M. Feugere, Les Armes des romains de la république à l’antiquité tardive (Paris, 1993), M. Bishop and J. Coulston, Roman Military Equipment (London, 1993), and P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981) and ‘Pilum, gladius and pugio in the Late Republic’, Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies 8 (1997), pp. 41–57. On the find of a probable Roman scutum see W. Kimmig, ‘Ein Keltenschild aus Aegypten’, Germania 24 (1940), pp. 106–111.

  6. On velites Polybius 6. 22. 1–4. On legionary numbers see A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2000), pp. 50–51.

  7. See M. Bell, ‘Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army’, Historia 14 (1965), pp. 404–422, Goldsworthy, Punic Wars (2000), pp. 53–4, 57–62, and The Roman Army at War 100 BC–AD 200 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 138–140, 179–180.

  8. See Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (2000), pp. 36–44, 52–53, for an introduction to Roman politics and a discussion of commanders.

  9. Various strengths of allied cohorts: 460, Livy 23. 17. 11; 500, Livy 23. 17. 8; 570, Livy 23. 19; 600, Livy 28. 45. We do not know if these were ‘paper’ or actual strengths.

  10. Disputes between joint commanders, see Polybius 3. 70. 1–12, 94. 7–10, 100. 1–105. 11.

  11. Roman manpower see Polybius 2. 24. 1–17, with discussion in Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 196–203 and P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971).

  12. For the Carthaginian military system in general see Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (2000), pp. 30–36; for a discussion of the poor evidence for Punic armies see J. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 14–16; for an interesting discussion of Gallic, Spanish and other tribal contingents in Hannibal’s army see L. Rawlings, ‘Celts, Spaniards, and Samnites: Warriors in a Soldiers’ War’, in T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), pp. 81–95. D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars attempts to reconstruct Punic equipment and organisation in some detail and presents a thorough survey of the scant evidence, but inevitably many of his conclusions are highly conjectural.

  13. The armies left to defend Spain and Africa, Polybius 3. 33. 5–16.

  14. Lonchophoroi, e.g. Polybius 3. 72. 3, 83. 3, 84. 14; equipping Libyans with Roman arms, 3. 87. 3.

  15. Marriage alliances between Punic aristocrats and Numidian royalty, e.g. Polybius 1. 78. 1–9, Livy 29. 23. 2-8; in Spain, DS 25. 12, Livy 24. 51. 7, Silius Italicus 3. 97, 106.

  16. 500 Numidians, Livy 26. 38. 11–14; Libyans at Saguntum, Livy 21. 11. 8; Gauls at Tarentum, Polybius 8. 30. 1; speiras at Cannae, Polybius 3. 114. 4, cf. 6. 24. 5.

  17. Emphasis on the greater experience of Hannibal’s men compared to the Romans in 218, Polybius 3. 70. 9–11; Spanish units interspersed with Gauls at Cannae, 3. 114. 4; poor march discipline of Gauls, 3. 79. 6–8; Tarentum, 8. 30. 1–4, Livy 24. 9. 16.

  CHAPTER 3

  1. Polybius’ description of Paullus, 3. 107. 8; the Illyrian War, Polybius 3. 19. 13, Livy 22. 35. 3, 40. 349. 11, Frontinus Strategemata 4. 1. 45.

  2. The bill to grant Minucius equal power with Fabius, Livy 22. 25. 1–19; Varro’s character and career, 22. 25. 18–26. 4.

  3. Livy 22. 34. 2–35. 4; for a discussion suggesting a closer link between Varro and Paullus see J. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 73–75.

  4. For narratives emphasizing factions see B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 20, 83–84, and to a lesser extent Lazenby (1978), pp. 4, 108. H. Scullard, Roman Politics 220–150 BC (London, 1951) represents an extreme form of this view.

  5. Polybius 3. 107. 9–15 with discussion in F. Walbank, Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 439–440, 440; Telamon 2. 24. 3, Walbank 1 (1970), p. 199.

  6. Livy 22. 36. 1–5; B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 134–141, and P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), p. 419 argue for the lower total; vague comments attributed to Paullus, Polybius 3. 109. 5, Hannibal, Livy 22. 40. 7, 41. 5, suggest the higher total, but should not be pushed too far.

  7. For Fabius’ legions and their origins see Walbank 1, pp. 410–411; Appian Hannibalic War 8 claims that Servilius Geminus had taken over Sempronius Longus’ legions in 217.

  8. Livy 22. 38. 2–5; for the sacramentum see B. Campbell, The Emperor and the Roman Army (Oxford, 1984), pp. 19–32.

  9. The election of the praetors and their distinguished records, see Livy 22. 35. 5–7.

  10. Lazenby (1978), p. 75, and Brunt (1971), p. 419.

  11. Polybius 3. 108. 2–109. 13.

  12. Livy 22. 38. 6–40. 4, 41. 13, 49. 6–12, cf. Plutarch Fabius Maximus 14–16, Appian, Hann. 17–19.

  13. Livy 22. 40. 7–8.

  14. See P. Erdkamp, ‘Polybius, Livy and the Fabian Strategy’, Ancient Society 23 (1992), pp. 127–147 for a discussion of the evidence.

  15. Plutarch, Lucullus 11. 1; Fabius’ cautious and stubborn nature see Plutarch, Fabius Maximus passim, esp. 1 and 25.

  16. Hannibal waiting for the harvest to ripen, Polybius 3. 107. 1–2 with comments in Walbank 1 (1970), p. 441; the tradition that the consuls joined the army before Hannibal moved, see Livy 22. 41. 4–43. 8 with comments in Lazenby (1978), p. 76.

  17. Polybius’ belief that Hannibal’s primary aim in 216 was to fight a battle, 3. 107. 2–3; the Carthaginian spy, Livy 22. 33. 1–2; on intelligence gathering in general see M. Austin and B. Rankov, Exploratio (London, 1995).

  18. Livy 22. 40. 6.

  19. Gisgo see Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 15. 2–3; the Romans’ careful scouting, Livy 22. 44. 1.

  20. Polybius 3. 110. 1–3.

  21. Polybius 3. 110. 4–11; Lazenby (1978), p. 77 doubted that it would have been impossible for the Romans to withdraw, but do
es not provide a convincing argument to support this.

  22. Polybius 3. 111. 1–11.

  23. Polybius 3. 112. 1–5.

  24. Polybius 3. 112. 6–113. 1.

  CHAPTER 4

  1. Polybius 3. 113. 1–6, Livy 22. 45. 5–46. 1.

  2. Polybius 3. 112. 1–5, Livy 22. 44. 5–45. 4.

  3. For the suggestion that Paullus was in fact in command see P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (1981), pp. 184–186.

  4. Polybius’ description of the battlefield, see Walbank, Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 435–438. When I visited the site in the summer of 1999, the actual line of the river conformed to none of the maps I had with me.

  5. K. Lehmann, Klio 15 (1917), p. 162, and Klio (1931), pp. 70–99; and H. Delbrück (trans. W. Renfroe), History of the Art of War 1 (Nebraska, 1975), pp. 324–325.

  6. J. Kromayer & G. Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder (1903–1931) III, 1, pp. 278–388, followed by inter alia J. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 77–78.

  7. P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), p. 184.

  8. Livy 22. 36. 4.

  9. For the general accounts of each side’s deployment see Polybius 3. 113. 2–114. 8, Livy 22. 45. 6–9; for a detailed discussion of strengths see Appendix 1.

  10. Polybius 3. 117. 8–9; for their possible identity see Lazenby (1978), pp. 79–80, Connolly (1981), p. 187; examples of triarii guarding the camp include Livy 35. 4 and 44. 37, but in contrast to Cannae, in neither case did the army plan to fight a battle.

  11. Issus, Polybius 12. 18. 2–4.

  12. For a discussion of formations see A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War (Oxford, 1996), pp. 176–183; Vegetius 3. 14–15 allocated a frontage of 1m (3 feet) and a depth of 2.1m (7 feet) to a Roman legionary. Elsewhere Polybius claimed that each legionary occupied 1.8m (6 feet) square, but the passage is heavily stylized and seems improbable; 18. 30. 5–11.